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Abstract

The fast fashion industry has developed a supply chain that optimizes profits by
manufacturing garments from developing countries at extremely low costs. With
consumer preferences pressuring brands to produce new cheap trends and products at
rapid speed, the brunt of the costs are placed in countries where managers, suppliers, and
governments turn a blind eye for the sake of economic stability and development. In
moments of crisis, key players have chosen to respond in ways that reflect their priorities
and incentives. Brands have reflected in their decision making the influence of consumer
demand and sensitivity to media through risk of tarnishing their reputations. Through the
case studies of the 2013 Factory Fire in Bangladesh and the current crimes against
humanity on the Uyghur ethnic community in the cotton region of China, we analyze
what challenges and incentives are brands facing when making decisions on how to take
action during moments of crises.
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Chapter One: Introduction
With the globalization of markets and cultures, fashion has evolved into a global
commodity of mass production. The fast fashion industry developed a supply chain
optimizing profits by manufacturing garments from developing countries at extremely
low costs. Countries such as China, Bangladesh, Vietnam and India are four of the largest
garment exporters in the world. As of 2019, the fast fashion market size is estimated to be
worth around $35.8 billion and has grown to have the largest supply chains in production
and consumption. With consumer preferences pressuring brands to produce new cheap
trends and products at rapid speed, the brunt of the costs are placed in countries where
managers, suppliers, and governments turn a blind eye for the sake of economic stability
and development. Like many industries, the globalization of the fashion industry has led
to an unethical and unsustainable development where humans and the environment suffer.
The overconsumption and high demand for fast fashion has created a toxic dynamic
between countries who manufacture the products and the multinational corporations that
sell them. Each company within the fashion industry has had to address these issues in
some capacity, and their actions are either held accountable and made transparent, or
hidden and swept under the rug. In moments of crisis, key players have chosen to respond
in ways that reflect their priorities and incentives. Brands have reflected in their decision
making the influence of consumer demand and sensitivity to media through risk of
tarnishing their reputations. Moreover, a country’s political and economic environment in
addition to where in the supply chain the crisis occurs constrains how brands are able to
respond. Through the case studies of the 2013 Factory Fire in Bangladesh and the current
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crimes against humanity on the Uyghur ethnic community in the cotton region of China,
we analyze what challenges and incentives are brands facing when making decisions on
how to take action during moments of crises.
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Chapter Two: History of the Fast Fashion Industry

Britain’s Industrial Revolution
To understand how the fast fashion industry was developed, we must first
recognize the cultural and industrial revolution as a whole. In the late 17th century,
Britain was the first to see this change during the enclosure movement and industrial
revolution. The revolution showcased a transition from methods of hand production to
machine production. New chemical manufacturing and iron production processes were
introduced to improve the efficiency and productivity of the system. The enclosure
movement led to urbanization and rise of factory systems, now the backbone of the fast
fashion industry. The first factory produced cotton textiles and yarn; also introducing
children and women labour into the workforce as factory workers.
The factory system led to the appearance of “slop shop” stores that provided
cheap, ready made garments for purchase. Today, a slop shop would be similar to a
classic thrift store, stereotypically known to attract working class people because of their
second-hand, lower priced garments (Newman 1952; 249). These shoppers were
predominantly peasants or middle class citizens who did not have the time or income to
produce their own clothes (Lemire 1984;28). As wage labor became more common, more
and more people began shopping for ready-made clothing given they no longer had time
to make their own clothes. Consumer preferences began shifting, normalizing the wear of
premade clothing. The production originated in tailor shops with ready-made petticoats

6
being the first popular trend within the industry by the late 17th century (Lemire
1984;28).
Technological innovations played a significant role in the growth of this industry
given its ability to reduce costs of production. Ready-made garments (RMG) were mainly
composed of cotton material. Prices of cotton imported into Britain continued to lower
because of technological advances, increasing the output of finished garments and
lowering their selling prices. Some of the major inventions of the mid 1800s included the
spinning jenny, water frame, spinning mule, self-acting mule, flying shuttle, power loom,
American cotton gin, and sewing machine (Phelps 2015; 18). These 8 key inventions
brought a new aspect to the industry which continues to be reflected in today's supply
chains.

Cotton Production
Cotton is a popular material source for the fast fashion industry. Its manufacturing
process of raw cotton is much quicker and more efficient compared to other common
fabrics such as linen and wool. Cotton became easily accessible and provided better
quality than its competitors making it a demand high amongst retailers. With demand for
cotton skyrocketing, the American South became a huge factor in the supply of cotton to
Europe.
Once the slave-cotton paradigm spread from the West Indies to the United States,
the South was able to bypass all other cotton producing countries. “Exports from South
Carolina ballooned from less than 10,000 pounds in 1790 to 6.4 million pounds in 1800”
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(Beckert 2014;102). Through the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney, a machine
used to more effectively remove the seeds from upland cotton, it became cheaper to
produce and expand cotton production as well as increase labor. The expansion of the
slave trade route looked to double its numbers given the states unlimited supply of labour,
land, capital and political power.

Industrialization
International capital investments transformed America's infrastructure. Slavery in
the American South reduced production costs impacting the price of American raw cotton
exported to Europe. Cotton could arguably be the first global commodity as it connected
slaves in the South to wage workers in the North and manufactures and consumers in
Europe (Beckert; 2014; 133). “European merchants were more than willing to invest
capital not just into the South but also the North” (Linden 2016; 9). European regions and
the U.S became reliant on the supply chain of cotton making up 61% of the value of all
U.S products being shipped abroad (Beckert 2014; 243).
The predicatibly to the cotton production industry was tarnished through the
outbreak of the Civil War. Cotton exports had fallen dramatically leading to the shutdown
of European mills until countries like Brazil, Egypt, and China could replace the supply
chain of the raw cotton. After the Civil War and the abolishment of slavery, government
policies were able to bring back the Souths cotton economy by ensuring cheap laborers
through sharecropping. Tenant farmers were bound to the property and land owner. To
stabilize the European and Northern American societies, many workers found
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employment in textile mills building a new form of labor structure. The control of the
workers and production systems were used to ensure efficiency and profitability, a
fundamental aspect of capitalism in industrialization (Linden 2016; 11).

Post Industrialization
In the transition to post industrialization, the replacement of general stores to mass
retailers was where American apparel supply chains blossomed. During the 1870s to
1880s, general stores began as full-service wholesaler supply chains and were replaced
with department stores, mail-order catalogues, and chains (Abernathy et al 1995;178).
Retailers at the time did not consider the perspectives of the consumers but prioritized
minimizing production costs. This meant placing orders to their manufacturers on time.
Products were replaced up to four times a year (Taplin 2014; 249).
World War II created a shift in the supply chain system as product variation
lowered. The more efficient mass production technique, progressive bundle system,
provided a large supply of garments at extremely low prices providing in house brands
and product designs the ability to compete against manufacturers (Doeringer & Crean
2005). “The mass retailers who managed to outsource their production to developing
countries grew in size and gained market share. While retailers who started with domestic
manufacturers started losing market share and profitability” (Linden 2016;13). The
competitive nature of the industry laid the groundwork for the quick transition to
outsourcing becoming the new norm.
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The liberalization of trade regimes allowed for American retailers to outsource
their production in developed countries. Consumers preferred the cheapest prices for
products through this system. By sourcing materials from developing countries, large
retailers could depend on supply chain models which relied on economies of scale to
market apparel. Production occurring in the U.S stayed within the category of specialty
items, while developing countries were able to leverage this growth to industrialize (Cline
2012; 57). By using economies of scale, fashion brands like Forever 21, TopShop, and
Zara have the advantage of shaping global production networks. The buyer-driven
ideology provided them with a role of design and market, while manufacturers focused
on apparel.

Fast Fashion
The current model defined as fast fashion has apparel companies lowering the cost
of garment due to cheaper production overseas. Developed in Europe, fast fashion is a
sector of the apparel industry providing clothing with the latest trends at a fraction of the
cost. Prior to the emergence of fast fashion, retailers focused on meeting seasonal
demands. Their stores needed management for back of the house storage and bulk orders
of inventory, leading to end of season markdowns and sales (Doeringer & Crean 2005).
Retailers used to care little for the customers preference, unlike today, where customer
preference is at the heart of the fast fashion industry. These retailers now place smaller
orders with greater product variety, lowering inventory costs on deck and shortening the
time between trends. These products can reach consumer demands, provide short product
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life cycles, and reduce production runs for the retailer (Linden 2016; 16). With the rise of
globalization, the low entry barriers, and standardized production for a mass market, the
attractiveness of outsourcing from developing countries remains strong (Taplin 2014;
248). Fast fashion has grown to be one of the largest chains of production and
consumption. One in six people work in some part of the global fashion industry making
it the most labor dependent industry (Ross & Morgan 2015).

Global Commodity and Supply Chain
Understanding the development of the fast fashion industry provides us context
for diving into the fast fashion supply chain and commodity chain. A commodity supply
chain is a “network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished
commodity,” in this case, an article of clothing (Hopkin & Wallerstein 1986; 159). The
supply chain focuses on bringing that commodity to the buyers. The success of a retailer's
supply chain relies on its ability to be flexible. Product flexibility provides a competitive
advantage given the nature of the industry and the externalities created by the physical
presence of numerous suppliers and producers. “The geographical interdependent
networks of factories, small firms, and specialized local labor markets allows us to
understand the importance of flex” (Porter 1990).
The fast fashion supply chain is uniquely intricate and cannot be narrowed down
to just one type of supply chain management. The supply chain itself looks into the raw
materials of products, the production networks, trade channels, marketing networks, etc.
making it difficult to fully analyze all its complexities. The industry uses just-in-time
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supply chains to increase their product variety through low initial orders and quick
production of products (Doeringer & Crean 2006). Company brands also play a crucial
role in identifying the geographical dispersion or concentration of raw materials, exports,
and products specific to each company. The buyer-driven fashion industry is governed by
large trading companies and retailers who’s brand image can decentralize production
networks (Appelbaum & Gereffi 1994; 44). Given that the industry is both buyer driven
and information driven; supply chains will look different for each retailer.
There are however commonalities amongst all retailers impacting the
characteristics of their supply chains. Retailers are always looking to increase market
share. Opening stores globally is a way for retailers to achieve this goal. They are also
trying to meet consumer demands through investing in integrated information
infrastructures in their supply chain. To meet customer satisfaction, providing short
development cycles and fast prototyping creates a responsive supply chain and allows for
quick turnaround between products to customers. Finally, all retailers face the pressure on
performance from the stock market since most retailers are often publicly traded
companies (Tokatli 2007; 23). A brand's reputation is almost as important as the product
they sell.

Consumers
A retailer's supply of a product is shaped by the customer's demand. Knowing
their customers' role and influence in the model plays a significant part in the production
of apparel. Especially in the fast fashion industry, consumers seek pleasure and

12
gratification from shopping at these retailers, further enticing retailers to provide new and
trendy products quickly. Customers of the fast fashion industry love the fact that what
they buy in stores today will be replaced with new products within the next week. The
continued pressure on retailers to meet these high demands leads to cutting corners
behind the stage where the developing countries, garment workers, and natural resources
bear the cost.
The fast fashion industry provides room for retailers to cut costs increasing their
profit margin. Fast Fashion retailers have almost twice the average profit margin of their
more traditional competitors like department stores (Cline 2012; 96). Companies are
focused on keeping customers coming back to their stores. The industry offers new trends
that are constantly being updated and changed. We see this same cycle occurring with the
tech industry, where individuals line up for the latest version of their iphones, computers,
earphones, etc. These products are developed with the intent of being replaced and
disposed of. To increase profits, retailers need their supply chains to provide quick
response and enhanced design in order to keep up with demand (Cachon & Swinney
2011). If brands can reduce their design lead time, they are more effective in getting new
styles in the stores and to their customers.

Outsourcing and Internal Production
Retailers looking to enhance their product flexibility are attracted to the system of
outsourcing. These flexible supply chains use internal processes and integrate technology
to increase their functions to make information transparent; accelerating decisions
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regarding, sourcing, buying, merchandising, and design (Linden 2016). Managing
product and inventory effectively through outsourcing can provide many benefits
compared to traditional internal production. Benefits to a brand include lowering worker
wages as well as taxes. Outsourcing also creates minimal investments in manufacturing
facilities reducing the risk of capital loss. More capital can provide opportunities for
market expansion (Gorranson 2007). Outsourcing can reduce and prevent many costs
from occurring but can also lower the qualities of their products. Retailers who outsource
must also be aware of the macroeconomic volatilities of their supplier countries.
Internal production has its own benefits as well. Companies like Zara, use mainly
internal production to provide more flexibility to “fashion mistakes.” By having internal
control of the production process, Zara can quickly adjust and correct their production
lines if certain products are not selling. Sourcing near headquarters and operating in
mid-season countries where inventory turnover is much higher reduces the production
lead time. Faster advanced production communication systems and workforces shorten
product life cycles creating lean product management (Linden 2016). Given that internal
production requires significant investments in fixed assets, production costs for
companies like Zara are much higher than those only outsourcing. We see brands using a
blend of both internal and external production to mitigate some of these costs.
Outsourcing from countries like Morocco, Turkey, Sri Lanka, and China provide
companies with apparel that meets the internal production material quality without the
additional costs (Inditex Annual Report, 2009).
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Consequences
We’ve discussed how the industrialization era led to the creation of the fast
fashion industry. With the rise of fast fashion, impacts on the environment and human
rights have also become more prominent. The development of the industry has shown us
how consumers value product price over the impact of production on the environment.
Given the characteristics of the current textile and clothing industry and the generation of
pollution and disposability, consumer purchases, predominantly from the West, inevitably
fund the continued detriment on the earth and on different communities. The
Environmental Protection Agency found that on average, Americans throw away 68 lbs of
textilers per person a year (Cline 2012: 122). Retailers often lack the responsibility of end
of life management of their clothing given the lack of accountability on that side of the
system. Fast fashion garments are commonly made of plastic fibers and end up in landfills
where they are left as waste. This linear model leads to depletion of natural resources as
well as growing carbon footprint. 145 million tons of coal and 2 trillion gallons of water
are used in the fiber production each year by the industry (Siegle 2001).
The current processes include producing man-made fibers that are extremely
energy intensive as well as manufacturing plants that create hazardous wastewater from
volatile organic compounds like monomers and solvents contaminating soils and
groundwater systems. Man-made fibers include plastics composed of synthetic materials
made with petroleum and cellulosic, chemically processed wood pulp, cotton scraps, or
saw dust (Cline 2012; 83). Supplier countries often lack incentives to enforce
environmental laws and regulations in supplier countries. Around 10% of China’s
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environmental laws and regulations are actually enforced due to self interested local
governments and factory owners who turn a blind eye (Economy 2007). Developing
countries are pursuing economic growth at the cost of environmental protection.
The environmental consequences of the fast fashion supply chain are
interconnected with human rights impacts. With cotton being the most prominent
material used in the fashion industry, cotton farmers are exposed to many health risks
including carcinogens contaminating water supply from the use of pesticides necessary
for plant growth. While the fashion industry has been exposed of their impacts on
garment workers, farmer health and safety have lacked the same type of awareness.
Punjab is one of the largest growers of cotton in India. Compared to other regions, the
state has higher levels of people with cancer and children born with birth defects like
autism. For the last 16 years, one farmer commits suicide every 30 minutes in India (Ross
& Morgan 2015). The cost to farmers not only takes a physical toll but also a mental one.
The inability to meet the fast and high demands for cotton due to inadequate technologies
lead farmers into debt, scrambling to meet the rapid increase in expectations. The fast
fashion supply chain has developed unsustainably to meet the demands of consumers at
all costs. In the next section, we examine the breaking points of the fast fashion system,
where cutting corners has reached its limits and the fast fashion industry actors are
exposed.
Crisis Points of the Fast Fashion
The unsustainability of the fast fashion industry does not come without its cost.
By putting the global supply chain of the fast fashion industry into context of how it came
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to be, we can now analyze why crises occur and why there is little response to solving the
issues at play. Recognizing the roles of each actor (global brands, governments of
supplying nations, consumers, garment workers, etc) and the pressures or demands of
each actor gives the opportunity to understand these breaking points.

Fragmentation of the Production Process
By nature of the global supply chain production process and its lack of
transparency, it is no surprise when there is a need to trace back global brands to hold
them responsible for their supply chains, the operation is extremely tedious. Through the
use of subcontractors and multinational supply chains for various sourcing materials
required by brands, production across borders is complex. The participation of
developing countries have only increased as western brands look to increase flexibility,
market share, and profit maximizing behaviors (OECD, 2013). The loss of control brands
and suppliers have over the flow of products and materials through the use of outsourcing
is both a strategy to avoid responsibility but also a risk considering the lack of
management oversight and inefficiency in the communication line. This is particularly a
challenge for consumers, governments, and NGOs to hold brands accountable when
crises occur in the supply chain process (Larsen, p.635).

Brand Sensitivity
The emphasis for the need of transparency and accountability cannot be
overstated; it is the backbone for creating change in the fashion industry’s production
line. As consumers begin to question and care more about where their products are
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coming from, brands need to incorporate these concerns into their brand image and
reputation. A brand’s image is almost as important to a consumer as the product itself.
The value of a company is determined heavily by how it markets itself and its product.
An unveiling of its faults can lead to a reduction in customer loyalty, competitive
position, and market value. A brand's ability to build back its reputation after a crisis is
dependent on many things, the size of the company, scope of the crisis, previous brand
image, and consumer loyalty, all of which interact and vary depending on how different
actors respond to the crisis itself. Labor conditions of fashion companies are constantly
being exposed under public scrutiny (Taplin 2014). When responding to a crisis, brands
consider the risk to their reputation as a determining factor of decision making.
Management must ask itself when under pressure to respond whether addressing concerns
will in the end make it more profitable. Given the current climate and context of the
supply chain, brands have the continued incentive to ignore claims until proven guilty,
and even then, continue to avoid change.

Political Environment of Developing Countries
As global brands increase their outsourcing from developing countries, the risks
to their supply chain become increasingly reliant on the external factor of the nation.
Government transitions, state development, shifts in political power, are aspects of these
developing countries that influence the policies and production process between suppliers
and Western brands. “In developing countries, such lax regulatory environments are
criticized for providing de facto support for labor wrongdoings in the export sector”
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(Taplin, 2014). Multinational enterprises recognize developing countries lack the
government capacity and the willingness to enforce regulations given the political
pressures to maintain relations to enhance personal economic growth and gain global
power (ILO). Brands must recognize when crises occur in these foreign countries the
ripple effect it will have within their supply chain.

Labor Conditions and Human Rights
Offshore sourcing has become prominent for global brands because of the
minimal enforcement of labor conditions and lack of human rights in certain countries.
The demand to keep labor costs and production costs low stem from the competitive
nature of the market (appelbaum P.48). Retailers look to maintain profit by reducing the
price they pay their manufacturers, who in turn put pressure on their contractors to reduce
the margin they are willing to pay. Contractors are forced to reduce costs by either
lowering the product quality standards, reducing wage for garment works, or further sub
contracting from lower-cost factories. This race to the bottom often leads contractors
deciding on a combination of those three. As a result, the costs fall into the hands of the
most vulnerable individuals. The impacts on the working conditions of these garment
workers are seen most prominently in moments of crisis. Governments are left
responding to both the pressures of the global brands, but also its civil society who now
have reason and a platform to voice concerns and demand change. In the next section I
will expand on these crisis points in two specific cases, in Bangladesh and China. We will
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see how different agents respond to the breaking points of the fashion supply chain and
why they responded the way they did.

20

Chapter Three: Rana Plaza Factory Collapse

What Happened
The collapse of the Dhaka garment factory in Bangladesh killing over 1,134
people and injuring more than 2,500 people was a worldwide wake up call to the
neglectance towards the sustainability of the global fashion supply chain. The days
leading up to the disaster, garment workers voiced concern over the cracks in the building
walls and the vibrations of the machines. While shops closed at the Rana Plaza because
of the signs of structural failure, these workers, majority of them women and children,
were suppressed by the factory managers and were told to continue working. They were
threatened to be fired if they did not show up and the women couldn’t afford the cost. On
April 24th, 2013 the day of the event, 2,000 to 4,000 workers went to work that day
(Ashwin, 2020). Managers had locked the gates of the factory during the day, as they do
every day, to prevent workers from stealing. On this day, the repercussions of this one
action led to lives being lost and workers being severely injured. There were many ways
in which the loss of this disaster could have been prevented. Abiding by the proper
building regulations alone could have prevented the collapse in the first place. The lack of
agency in the workers when trying to voice their concerns for their safety also showcased
the disrespect within the institutions involved. The previous conditions of the Rana Plaza,
the impact of the event, and the responses to the collapse from key stakeholders are where
the true reflection of the ambiguity and irresponsibility by the industry as a whole were
shed to light.
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Previous Conditions
The collapse of the Rana Plaza was an unforgettable strategy and an avoidable
one. Understanding the decision making and lack thereof behind the production of the
plaza as well as the garment worker conditions leading up to the collapse showcases how
disturbing the systems of manufacturing clothes are. Garment workers were paid roughly
45 cents an hour, arriving at the factory at 7 am and leaving at 10pm every night (True
Cost, 2018). With factory managers responding to the demands of their contracts, the
burden of production was left to the workers, overworked and underpaid. The Rana Plaza
had violations during production that were neglected. The plaza was originally planned in
2006 to be a four story complex structure designed to be a shopping complex later
approved to be a six story building with two additional illegally made stories on top.
Level three to eight consisted of six garment factories. The building was not designed to
withstand the vibrations and weight of heavy machinery. By 2013, it had a ninth floor
built and ready to be used for another factory (True Cost, 2018). To make things worse,
the land itself was weak, as the foundations of the plaza used to be a lake. Any additional
vibrations caused by generators, machines, and workers, were not supported by the
fragile base. As a result of managers cutting corners and overlooking fire/safety hazards
and building regulations, the horrors of the collapsed building took place.
Impact
Rana Plaza was a symbol of how low wage garment workers come at almost
unimaginable costs. The ready made garment industry (RMG) makes up ¾ of
Bangladesh's wealth, roughly 20 billion of income yet only 2% of the population are
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workers, 3.5 million with majority of them women (Feldman, Shelley, and Jakir Hossain,
2021). A hard truth of their reality is the daily harassment and assault they undergo at
work. The conditions in which these women have to go through in order to gain financial
independence and some level of agency is disheartening. 80% of the garment workers at
Rana Plaza were women (Shamima, 2014). It is also not uncommon for women to bring
their children to the sweatshops, given that no one is home to take care of them. While
the social gender norms in Bangladesh have progressed compared to other South Asian
countries its standards are still well below the expectations their suppliers set in the West,
women in a labor force that are being treated with abuse, harassment, and terrible
working conditions is not a choice for the women, but a necessity in order to generate
income to survive.

Protests
The public interest and media attention led to greater political pressures to create
change in regards to the disaster. Bangladesh was able to establish the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh, enforcing key stakeholders to compensate the survivors
and families of killed workers from the collapse. Even with the policy, push back from
brands like Benetton was still prominent. The target of $30 million compensation was
reached two years later, meaning the compensation process to those impacted could
finally begin (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2015). Movements surrounding the lack of
transparency sparked after seeing the difficulty of holding brands accountable for the
Rana Plaza disaster and the lack of long term impact was shocking. Labor activist groups
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such as the Clean Clothes Campaign stepped into the conversation to hold brands
accountable. Photographs and order forms collected from the rubble of the collapse
showed clear evidence of which brands had been involved. Well known global brands like
Benetton (Italy), Bonmarche (UK), Cato Fashions (USA), The Children's Place (USA),
El Corte Inglés (Spain), Joe Fresh (Loblaws, Canada), Kik (Germany), Mango (Spain),
Matalan (UK), Primark (UK/Ireland) and Texman (Denmark) were some of the many
brands linked to the production in the Rana Plaza (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2015).
Brands of this nature have kept up with the large demand for cheap clothing and built that
expectation amongst its factories. The push back from these brands stemmed from the
fact that many brands didn’t actually own these factories. Brands often contracted a
middle man to communicate to factory owners the demands of the brands. With
competition high, managers had no choice but to meet the demands of lowering garment
costs at the price of their garment workers' pay and working conditions. In response to the
collapse of the plaza, building managers were arrested only to be bailed out six months
later, an unsurprising response and one that reflects the true incentives behind the process
(Clean Clothes Campaign). Movements continue to fight back with brand accountability
and workers continue to spark conversation around the issue, yet the challenge still
remains of creating lasting change.
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What Were the Constraints?

Scope
The challenge addressing the concerns of accountability and transparency among
brands, factory owners, governments, stakeholders, and buyers, is the inability to put
blame on a specific agent. Bangladesh's RMG industry began in the late 1970s when the
Multi-Fiber Agreement was implemented to govern international trade of garment and
textiles from 1974 to 2004. Asian Tigers - Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and
Taiwan, were able to secure subcontracting arrangements and partnerships with
quota-free, labor surplus economies in the region with eyes on Bangladesh. The IMF and
World Bank provided additional demand for export-led growth coinciding with the shift
away from agriculture and toward urban industrialization in Bangladesh (Saxena, 2021).
The demand-driven integration into the competitive global economy continues to
influence and justify the decisions made by buyers and sellers to keep wages low and
limit the freedoms of their workers. Provided that the Bangladesh economy is driven by
its manufacturing and export industry, the lack of leverage from individual buyers is
especially salient. Production in this regard is of high capacity making it difficult for
brands to influence the production line. Brands and retailers are also seeing this issue; the
degree of leverage vis-a-vis supplier manufactures is highly dependent on their
relationships (Oka, 2020).

Brands have little influence on the manufacturer if their

production doesn’t depend solely on the one company. The burden of implementing
remediation provides no incentives to these suppliers. Solutions to addressing the poor
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labor conditions have attempted to spread the burden amongst all agents, but can only be
successful if the entire market shifts with it.
The complexity of the fashion supply chains is partly due to the lack of
understanding towards the scope of the problem. While the collapse of Rana Plaza was
indeed one of the largests and most damaging factory disasters in the world, the
remediation of the event was considerably unsuccessful. There are more than 8,000
factories in Bangladesh, all working in more or less the same terrible working and safety
conditions as the next (Saxena, 2021). The disaster itself showed how broken the system
is in Bangladesh and the lack of control the country has over it. The challenge of
understanding and acknowledging how difficult the road to remediating workers rights
and safety concerns has been the biggest barrier to creating significant long term change
in Bangladesh.

Brand Accountability
The current business models of retailers and brands are one of the constraints to
addressing the concerns of the fashion supply chain. By strategically making their
production networks extensive and complex, the garment business can remain profitable,
despite the labor law reforms, political barriers, and international competition. Businesses
can use indirect sourcing as a way to make themselves less attached to the manufacturing
processes while direct sourcing makes global fashion brands acknowledge the factories
they are using. Indirect sourcing is the most common way for brands and retailers to
disassociate themselves from the factories they have their clothes produced in (Saxena,
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2021). Western companies find this type of sourcing most attractive. Subcontracting
provides a lack of transparency to buyers and can allow them to not feel the burden of
their demands. This is a simple way to cut corners and be outside the scope of
regulations. This way, brands are able to demand for increases in production capacity
while keeping their costs low.

Brand Responsibility
Reforms such as the Accord on Building & Fire safety and the Alliance for
Worker Safety have provided a set of requirements to attempt to address the lack of
transparency and accountability among brands and supply factories. The Accord was a
project-oriented multi stakeholder governance of global brands, retailers, and trade
unions in direct response to the 2013 factory fire. The Accord addressed the fire,
electrical, and structural safety of factor buildings in the RMG industry. The Alliance
focused on improving the safety of workers within the factories of Bangladesh. The
Accord and the Alliance was a five-year legally binding agreement between western
brands and trade unions to ensure safe working environments. The Bangladesh
government believed the reforms to be a significant step in improving the reputation of
the country and the RMG industry (Rahman, 2020). Independent inspections regarding
the safety and working conditions were provided regularly and were publicly disclosed.
Brands that participated had committed to ensuring sufficient funds for remediation and
for maintaining sourcing relationships. While the concept of the Accord and Alliance was
progressive, only 27% of factories and roughly 50 global brands actually participated in
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the programs (NYU Stern Center, 2015). Only sophisticated factories and brands were
involved given they had better access to capital to make the changes expected of them.

Buyer Responsibility
Understanding buyer responsibility and power within the RMG industry as well as
their capabilities is one of the challenges regarding the effectiveness of the reforms.
While the Accord promotes inclusive governance, embodying industrial democracy and
transnational industrial relations within the labor force, some people have brought
awareness to the fact that corporate buying power still permeates through it. The Accord
doesn’t address the power relationships and lacks shared responsibility from buyers.
Buyers have the potential to influence suppliers in some cases but not in all cases. Tier 1
suppliers are no longer dependent on the individual buyers because they themselves have
grown into multinationals with multiple subsidiaries (Oka, 2020). Another important
determinant mentioned earlier was the indirect sourcing process that can decrease the
responsibility of brand engagement. Intermediaries like this can limit buying power from
brands. A strategy to some brands but a barrier to others.

Buyer Engagement
Proper buyer engagement is crucial to prompting active change within the supply
chain's labor conditions. Buyers can approach these changes through their auditing
practices, the formation of a commitment-based model, and brand advocacy at an
industry and national level (Oka, 2020). While challenges within these approaches remain
relevant, recognizing why these steps are important is crucial.
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The auditing process addresses the pressures on buyers to respond to the poor
working conditions of their supply chain. In this manner, the Code of Conducts (CoCs)
by brands enforces internal and external auditors inspection of suppliers and demand
remediation when violations are found (Aftermath 1309). The commitment based model
implements ways in which CoCs are held accountable, are multilateral, and are enforced
by brands (Oka, 2020). The model consists of information sharing, trust, and
problem-solving in collaboration between auditors, suppliers, and buyers. By executing
shared-responsibility in accountability, compliance of the CoCs can be enforced and
workers will have more opportunities to use their voices. Finally, advocacy expects that
brands are engaging with government sectors and address systemic changes with the
RMG industry. Their responsibility goes beyond compliance when advocacy is involved.
Additional pressure from Brands, can create moments within the industry to make
improvements, like raising minimum wage.

How did different parties respond?
While solutions to the global supply chains are available, we don’t see western
brands quickly jumping to address these issues. Reminding how big the beast actually is
puts into perspective how brands are able to respond. Bangladesh still has an export
dependent economy generating roughly 25 billion dollars per year. There is no single
actor that can bear the costs of redeveloping Bangladesh's garment sector, the challenge is
knowing who is responsible, both locally and globally, and knowing how much of the
cost they can cover.
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Response
After the disaster at the Rana Plaza, many companies chose to turn a blind eye and
not address their responsibilities toward the disaster. The impact of their lack of
acknowledgement were the families and survivors of the collapse who had to bear the
costs physically and emotionally. Actors involved with the recovery process included the
Bangladeshi government, NGOs, and global brands. The Accord and Alliance were the
two players in holding brands accountable.
The non-profit organization, Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) helped the
government with the investigation and put pressure on brands for funding. CCC received
just over a ⅓ of the $40 million needed in the fund for the survivors and families a year
after the tragedy. The most recognizable brands found to be involved in the disaster
included JCPenney, Walmart, and the Children’s Place. One of the first to act was Joe
Fresh, a fast fashion company owned by the Weston family and Primark, a British firm
also producing fast fashion. Weston agreed to compensate families of workers killed in
the disaster but only made one initial contribution. Primark publicly announced a $40
million relief fund but only put forth $12 million to family and workers. JCpenney
continued to deny their insights regarding the development and sourcing of apparel
produced in Bangladesh. Walmart donated about $1 million and the Children’s place
donated about $450,000 via BRAC USA (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2015).
The government has a clear mandate to ensure that victims of the Rana Plaza
disaster are fully compensated in a timely manner. Their role was to provide financial
compensation and give short term stipends to the victims. This however was deemed
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ineffective given that the stipends were small and were often taken advantage of (Clean
Clothes Campaign, 2015). Husbands often took the money from the injured women and
left them with nothing. The response to lack of government action led to strikes and riots
led by women garment workers (True Cost, 2018).

Where do we go from here?

Direct and Transparent Sourcing
One of the biggest constraints of holding brands accountable is the lack of
transparency. Creating direct and transparent sourcing allows for factories and brands to
develop collaborative relationships that bring opportunity to address supply chain
failures. Important aspects like, long-term-order forecasting, purpose driven compliance,
and business incentives should be implemented to ensure a shared responsibility towards
effective and proactive solutions (Saxena, 2020). To make this successful, direct sourcing
between the buyer and the supplier is necessary. Brands are considered aware of the
stability of the supply chain and whether suppliers are abiding by their CoC. The
subcontracting process requires more transparency and responsibility of brands to
conduct oversight.

Accountability
Government, NGOS, and media outlets are just some of the external actors that
influence how and when brands respond and behave. Holding brands and factories
accountable can be done in many different ways. The Rana Plaza Donor trust fund
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managed by the CCC was an attempt to bring justice to the families and victims of the
disaster, making brands acknowledge their failure in providing proper control of their
production line. The role of the media can impact how consumers perceive and behave
toward a company or industry, making or breaking their success and profitability.
American Magazine’s “Collapse at Rana Plaza” comments on how the definition of
garment workers has a direct relationship with how garment workers are valued. There’s a
reason why garment workers are not considered tailors or artists. The factory breakdown
of roles and responsibilities leaves one task per woman, devaluing her worth to a single
part of the piece of clothing. One worker adds the tag, one worker creates the seam,
leaving just enough room to justify paying these workers almost nothing.

The Accord
Continuing to support programs that help institutionalize ad hoc inter-brand
cooperation like the Accord can help to prompt shared responsibility amongst actors in
the RMG industry. This auditing approach mobilized the collective power of firms to
ensure suppliers remain compliant with safety requirements (Ashwin, 2020). To do this
effectively, understanding why a supplier may not be able to reach the safety
requirements must be addressed. The commitment-based model provides brands with the
obligation to step in when suppliers are not reaching their standards. To make sure brands
want to help keep their suppliers abiding by the requirements stems from respective
consumers, media, stakeholders, employees, and other external influencers.
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The global supply chain system can improve by holding brands accountable and
also responsible for where their products are coming from. This includes providing
capacity-building programs such as supplier induction training included in the Accord.
The Accord is just one of the many Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities
global firms can be a part of. By demanding brands to have CSR obligations, their
managers will have to understand the feasibility of implementing certain strategies and
solutions (Oka, 2020). For example, small or medium-sized firms have much harder time
reaching the Accord related expenses compared to larger formers given they have much
more capital to work with. The expectation is not that solutions and response needs to be
the same amongst brands and suppliers, rather the expectation is that workers rights and
safety conditions should be standardized across the board.

Conclusion
The disaster at the Rana Plaza was a reflection of the absence of a monitoring and
inspection system, the lack of transparency between suppliers and brands through indirect
sourcing, and the high demand set by consumers to lower prices on suppliers that were
already incapable of meeting the demands ethically. In order to effectively respond to and
prevent crises like these, brands must acknowledge their suppliers and be held
accountable for their production lines. Responsibility of abiding by the conditions set
internally must be shared. All actors both internally and externally must remain conscious
suppliers and consumers within the industry. The collapse of the Rana Plaza killing over
1,134 people and injuring more than 2,500 was an expected failure given the conditions
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of the RMG industry and a result of the demands of western consumers. In order to hold
the system accountable and repair what has been broken, we must bridge the gap between
those who are buying the products, and those who are producing them.
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Chapter Four: Forced labor in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

What Happened?
China is currently being accused of committing crimes against humanity and
genocide on the Uyghur population and other musilim ethnic groups. Roughly 12 million
Uyghur people live in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) a north west
region of China located in Xinjiang. According to BCC in 2020, researchers proved
around half a million people were being forced to pick cotton for the use of garments for
local and global brands. Global fashion brands are being targeted for their connections to
the region and are facing backlash from both China and their local consumers. Several
countries including the United States, Canada, Australia and European Union have
expressed serious concern about China's actions to eliminate the musilim community.
Global supply chains connected to the region have been targeted for inspection. Foreign
governments, media outlets, and NGOS are itching to find hard evidence of the
allegations, yet China's control of the region has made this extremely difficult.The overt
surveillance includes tracking of car number plates, security checkpoints, and cameras.
According to the Human Rights Watch, police have used mobile apps to track electricity
use, web browsing, and even how often they use their front doors (BCC 2021). People
that have managed to escape have shared stories of physical, mental, and sexual torture.
China denies allegations and calls the crackdown in Xinjiang “necessary to prevent
terrorism and root out Islamist extremism and that camps are an effective tool for
re-educating inmates in its fight against terrorism” (BCC 2021). China’s manipulative
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actions have led brands to face a difficult and public choice. Responding to the scenes
will force brands to choose between their expansion through China or their reputation at
home. Large global brands including Nike, H&M, and Adidas are some of the major
brands caught in the crossfire and bearing the cost of this crisis.

Previous Conditions
Making up 87% of cotton production in China in 2020, Xinjiang has made
significant contributions to the region's economic growth. It has been described by the
China Cotton Association as providing an opportunity to improve poverty levels and
economic growth in the region given their labor capacity in farming to processing to
exporting the raw material. In recent years, the XUAR has been recognized by Western
governments as evidence of systematic oppression of ethnic minorities in the region.
According to scholars and activists like the Human Rights Watch, the Chinese
Communist Party showcases its authoritarian control and campaign of repression calling
for crimes against humanity. “As many as 1.8 million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
and other Muslim minorities are, or have been, arbitrarily detained in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region” (Adams, p. 4 2020). The CCP has made it clear of their
objective to promote nationalism in the region provided that political indoctrination is
heavily integrated in the XUAR educational programs. China officials call these “job
training sessions” to address extremism, enforce national unity through education on the
importance of the CCP and Chinese Law (Dou 2019).
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Through heavy ground control and surveillance over the region, the CCP has been
able to mislead the public away from the targeted abuse of the Uyghurs and other ethnic
and religious minority groups. The deprivation of individual liberties of more than one
million civilians authorized by the CCP and local officials is only now being addressed on
the global stage. According to multiple sources, the restrictive applications of China’s
birth control politics through forced sterilization and coerced abortions are just some of
the ways the CCP has taken actions to eliminate the Muslim community. Through the
control of the Chinese government, local officials, and private companies demanding
supply from the region, unethical standards of labor on minorities are often further
engrained in the industry’s supply chain. Exposure of these behaviors are rare as powerful
actors put a copious number of barriers in place to prevent such scenes.

Impact
The global supply chain of the fashion industry has relied heavily on China for
sourcing both products themselves but also raw materials. Xinjiang has been producing
raw materials for the fashion industry, as well as for the automotive, solar energy, food,
and more. While the focus of this paper is on the impact and response of governments
and brands within the scope of the fashion industry, these industries are also having an
impact as well. American brands and retailers import more than 1.5 billion garments in
the U.S from China and represent more than $420 billion in retail sales (Swanson 2021).
The transferring of products at different stages throughout China has made it almost
impossible to track the origins of each article. Given Xinjiang's scale of cotton
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production, its materials are not just being exported directly to other countries but are also
being manufactured further throughout Asia. Some of the leading apparel retailers such
as H&M, Adidas, Puma had publicly announced to prohibit use of Xinjiang products. Yet
the challenges of enforcement stem from the difficulties tracing the origins of products by
their Chinese suppliers. This is because of the lack of access of independent auditors to
facilities in Xinjiang (Swanson 2021). According to the CECC, the following companies
are suspected of directly employing forced labor or sourcing from suppliers that are
suspected of using forced labor.

• Adidas

• Esprit

• Urumqi Shengshi

• Badger Sportswear

• H&M

Huaer

• Calvin Klein

• Hetian Taida

CultureTechnology

• Campbell Soup

• Huafu Fashion

Company

Company

Company

• Yili Zhuo Wan

• Coca-Cola Company

• Kraft Heinz Company

Garment Manufacturing

• COFCO Tunhe

• Litai Textiles

Company

Company

• Nike, Inc.

• Zhihui Haipai Internet

• Costco

• Patagonia, Inc.

of Things Technology

• Esquel Group

• Tommy Hilfiger

Company

With Cotton as a staple product of prominent raw materials, the supply chain of
many well-known brands across the globe are now under the microscope given the
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XUARs use of forced labor. The International Labor Organization defines forced or
compulsory labor as “all work or service which is extracted from any person under the
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered themself voluntarily”
(ILO 1930). Signs of forced labor as seen in Xinjiang are restriction of movement, use of
intimidation and threats, withholding of wages, and excessive overtime. A ripple effect of
the evidence in XUAR has sparked political and social action through protests and policy
proposals. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is one policy enacted by the United
States to ban cotton products made by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
As a result, U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained 43 shipments valued at more
than $2 million under the ban (NYT 2021). Canada and Britain have also limited goods in
similar ways. Continued response is being addressed as the conversation remains sparked.
Protests and public shaming against China have raised awareness of the issue. Consumers
as well as some celebrities have taken a stance by boycotting brands such as Nike,
Adidas, and H&M tainting the brand reputation and hurting their profits. One of the
boldest responses put into discussion recently was the U.S boycotting the 2022 Beijing
Winter Olympic Games, showcasing their stance against China's control of the Uyghurs
and unethical standards of forced labor. Both the brands involved in the scandal and the
CCP have created backlash and imposed serious reputational costs. Through these
actions, non-Chinese firms that have supported the surveillance state have been put on
defense as well (Hendrix 2021).
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What Were the Constraints?

Scope
The most prominent challenge for brands and other key actors to address the hot
spots of the industry's entire supply chain is the complexity of the entire process of
production. With a vast number of suppliers, textile firms, independent producers, and
intermediate consumers, all varying in production size, it is extremely difficult to create a
robust certification scheme to target unethical producers. There is no firm or brand that
can be targeted to take significant control of the market share to solve the collective
action problems of the industry. If anyone, it is China, which takes 40% of the entire
garment sector industry, making up more than Bangladesh, Vietnam, India, Germany, and
Italy’s combined production (Suzuki 2021). Xinjiang produces raw materials for the
RMG industry but other industries as well; according to the China Grain Reserve Group,
roughly 5.2 million metric tons of global production is from the XUAR. The cotton and
cottonseed oil are consumed almost exclusively as intermediate inputs in the production
of the final good. China’s ability to break up its production and make profit throughout
the transformation of raw materials to goods and services is purposeful and rigid. Their
complexity stems from being both producers and consumers of their products. Consumers
play a significant role in their purchasing power, influencing the demand of the market.
Because consumers never seek to purchase cotton in silo, their purchase of other goods
containing cotton from the region makes it extremely difficult to trace. A commodity’s
production line does not provide the proper tools to make a consumer’s ability to link
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their purchase to the ills of the value chain possible. This is partly due to the fact that the
RMG industry is a self-policed market where the majority brands, suppliers,
subcontractors, etc. don’t want consumers to have access to that information purely
because of the reputational risk of being caught cutting corners.
The supply chains of big companies like Nike, Apple, BMG, Gap, Etc. have little
power in addressing abuses in the country due to the fact that China’s role is so central to
the global economy. The United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade
accounted for $457.16 Billion of imports from China to the United States during 2020.
Cotton specifically is not a product being shipped directly across seas but is being
outsourced and integrated into other products. It’s difficult to hold the XUAR region
accountable given the U.S Customs and Border Protection simply does not have the
capacity to trace every imported good from China. Maybe through the development of
new tracking methods, the ability to link what the U.S. sees arriving in a port of entry
back to the raw materials produced in Xinjiang can be successful.
China’s control CCP
The constraints placed from political control in China is also part of what makes
bringing justice to the Uyghur people and proper response to forced labor and abuse in
the region as a whole challenging. The CCP holds great power and control through its
aggressive surveillance measures both on the ground, in the air, and through their
technology (Dou 2019). While international protests have been drawn over videos of
detention camps for Muslims in Xinjiang, further proof of actions have been difficult to
dig up given the restrictions enforced by policy to block attempts from journalists coming
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to investigate. Police closely monitor foreign researchers and actively prevent them from
getting close to the camps or to conduct interviews (Buckley 2018). The Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights how international enforcement or
traditional third-party audits are ineffective in holding the region accountable due to the
Chinese government interference and prevention. Assuming the entire region to be tainted
with different forms of coercive labor seems to be the only way for foreign actors to
approach next steps to undermine the area's production process (Adams 2020).
As a regional hegemon and powerful global actor, China's central state autonomy
over the cotton industry expands the issue beyond the brands involved, but to the
government’s themselves and their desires to meet the goals or demands of the entire
nation. Because of this, the Western brands and international governments seem to have
little influence on changing the behaviors towards the ethnic communities. Economic and
diplomatic policies to ensure global consumer responsibility cannot and will not be
implemented in the region given the heavy surveillance of the CCP on the region.

Response
Retail giants Nike and H&M have been at the top of the headlines taking on the
fight from China revealing how closely tied this issue is to Chinese politics. Speaking up
in response to the allegations of crimes against humanity also means speaking up against
the CCP. Both brands have expressed concern of the alleged use of the forced labor of the
Uighur minority and said they did not source products from the region. Their response
triggered backlash from China as the Communist Youth League, a Chinese Community
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Party Group, launched China wide campaigns defending Xinjiang cotton and criticizing
brands. H&Ms response to the boycotts and the celebrities cutting ties, announced in
Weibo that “it respects its Chinese consumer as always” and that it “does not represent
any political position” (BBC 2021). Brands are placed in a lose-lose situation, they either
take action and face the criticism from China or don’t take action and face reputational
costs from the western region. Sanctions imposed on officials in China by the European
Union, UK, US and Canada have led China to retaliate with sanctions of their own (BBC
2021). China announced that the sanctions from the West, which included travel bans,
asset freezes, and targeting senior officials in Xinjiang are “based on nothing but lies and
disinformation…” actively harming China's sovereignty through the spread of lies. China
sanctioned 10 people and four entities in Europe from entering the country and doing
business with the nation (BBC 2021).
A case like Badger Sportswear, a U.S based clothing company was able to stop
their imports from Hetian Taida Apparel in 2019 after media reports showed proof of
forced labor by internment camp detainees. Badger backed its sources with nonprofit,
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) who originally certified the
labor rights for the Hetian Taida factory and proved it to be compliant with the labor laws.
However, labor rights monitoring organization, Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) did
find that Badger had been importing goods made through forced labor and failed to
present the appropriate due diligence in the region (Adams 2020). Through the help of the
WRC, the U.S Customs and Border Protection issued a “Withhold Release Order” on all
garments produced at the factory after proving the “protections are produced, in whole or
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in part, using forced labor.” In response, Badger recently agreed to pay $300,000 to
human rights organizations helping bring justice to the victims in XUAR (Adams 2020).
One factory under pressure is the Huafu Fashion Company, one of the largest
mix-color yarn mills in the world. After media coverage resurfaced of 600 trainees,
majority of female workers, all dressed in camouflage standing at attention, brands like
Adidas, Esprit Holdings Ltd., and H&M faced more backlash as their garments were
traced back to these facilities. Local government called the Huafu site as part of the
establishment of large-scale vocational training and its monthly long job-training
programs were accused of having more than one third of the residents be Uighur minority
(Dou 2019). Adidas said it has advised its suppliers to prohibit yarn purchases from
Huafu pending its investigation. It has banned suppliers from hiring workers through
Xinjiang government agencies in 2016 saying it was concerned about forced labor and
discrimination. Esprit said it will be investigating Huafu. H&M has no plans to begin new
supplier relationships in the region. Nike said it was asking suppliers if they used cotton
from Xinjiang. This new development shows brands taking a vocal stance to the public to
represent their protection of their brands reputation and zero tolerance for forced labor.
What challenge comes next is whether these brand’s actions follow in line with their
voiced opinions. Given how these global brands have responded in the past to crises of
similar scale, the lack of accountability, transparency of their supply chains, and push
back from China might lead brands to fall through on their commitments.
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Now What
China’s government has continued to deny the allegations of using forced labor in
the XUAR and have expressed no interest in coming clean of their actions (BCC 2021).
Many new reports and public announcements shared from China say that local officials
are providing state training programs that are voluntary and are organized with the
purpose of helping impoverished residents find jobs. It’s been put on paper that no forced
labor is being used in the region and that any talk of it is “rumor or slander” (Dou 2019).
China’s strategy is to continue encouraging the vertical integration of the government's
manufacturing sector and plan to expand by moving textile and garment factories close to
the cotton production in Xinjiang (Lehr 2020). To reinforce the political agenda and
manipulate the allegations, their argument for Uyghur minority crackdown is to provide
education to prevent terrorism and Islamic extremism. China has described the evidence
revealed and news reports as part of an Anti-China Agenda. The U.S Government has
continued to act on their ban of cotton and tomatoes from the XUAR. The U.S trade law
calls for a Withhold Release Order (WRO). With the new developments around Xinjiang,
The U.S Custom and Border Protection have been attempting to flag down any shipment
of goods entering the United States that have been exposed to forced labor at any time in
the supply chain. Due to the inability to conduct traditional fact finding in Xinjiang, the
WRO is one of the only ways the U.S has sought out to track their imports.
Given the scope of the new report and the fact that the CCP is so intertwined with
the activities in Xinjiang, the gravity of next steps taken collectively by the global
community are going to not just shape the supply chain of the RMG but might go far as
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having implications in world politics. While the international actors may not fight on the
grounds for justice, they can surely show signals of their disapproval of China’s actions
by attacking their reputation. According to ESPN, as of November 18th, 2021 President
Joe Biden has grappled with the idea of boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.
The other ways the U.S have taken steps to hold Chinese officials responsible is through
policy such as the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act and the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act. The import ban on the region has also been placed by the EU,
U.S, Britain, and Canada and will remain until evidence of systematic use of forced labor
of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim ethnic minorities has ended.
The diplomatic row between the U.S and China has left brands unsure of what to
do next. With China consumers boycotting Nike, Adidas, and H&M brands, their
reputations are being dragged through the mud as the CCP complains that foreign brands
are tainting China’s name and the nation's success as a whole. “Brands must not rescind
on their human rights responsibilities in the face of this pressure,” said Chloe Cranston of
Anti-Slavery International, a member of the Coalition to End Forced Labor in the Uyghur
Region. The Better Cotton Initiative which promotes sustainable cotton has announced a
suspension on it’s approval for cotton from the XUAR. Nike, Adidas, H&M and other
brands connected to BCI are now pressured by China to either disassociate from the
organization or get out of China (Reuters 2021). Brands have to now decide between their
reputation with home consumers or loss of growth of not staying or expanding in China,
an economic superpower with the largest consumer population.
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Conclusion
The accusations in Xinjiang over serious human rights violations against the
Uyghurs have showcased the difficulties brands face when crises occur. Through the lack
of transparency of the industry, the involvement of other government powerhouses, and
the competitive nature of the supply chain and consumer market for fast fashion, brands
are often put in situations in which taking responsibility for their actions is not
incentivized. With China’s government and their consumers on the other side of the court,
the economic superpower has given brands little room to do the right thing. In an industry
that does support taking responsibility, the news in Xinjiang provides governments and
private sectors the opportunity to work together to overcome the industry's challenges.
Taking both a noneconomic and economic approach as well as private sector initiatives to
achieve a more ethical approach to the supply chain model, there is a chance enough
momentum can be generated. Taking collective action, may be the one of the ways for
crises like these to be fully addressed and actors held accountable throughout the supply
chain.
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Chapter Five: Final Remarks
As reflected in both the Bangladesh Rana Plaza factory fire and the Xinjiang
region forced labor scandals, the global supply chain of the fashion industry has
promoted unsustainable practices bound to break under pressure. Brands have played a
significant role in shaping the supply chain to become dependent on a fractured system
embedded with human rights abuses and significant environmental costs. When we
question whether brands are doing the good they say they are doing, extensive research
on the company's background is necessary. Knowing most fashion companies don’t
display their labor conditions or codes of conduct on their websites shows how little
transparency and accountability these brands have with their suppliers and their
consumers. The risk to a brand's reputation incentivizes them to distract consumers away
from their production process while they increase their profit margins through cutting
costs at the manufacturing level. While having brands take responsibility through
increased transparency is a necessary step in improving the process of production in the
RMG industry, the role of other key actors and their interactions with brands seems to
also be part of the conversation of accountability. Government unilateral action, NGOs,
media outlets, in collaboration with global institutions and corporations, are needed given
the scope of the global supply chain and the competitive nature of the market. By
reflecting on moments of crises, we can further understand the complexities of the
industry and continue to learn from the mistakes made providing us opportunity to take
steps towards creating an ethical supply chain.
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